RDG NR-GN SP01

Issue Four

Date June 2019

Guidance Note –

Meeting the Needs of Passengers Stranded on Trains

Synopsis

This document provides guidance on the planning for and implementing of arrangements to meet the needs of passengers who become stranded on trains (for whatever reason), noting that these need to be agreed jointly

Submitted by



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

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Applicability

This Guidance Note has been prepared for passenger train operating companies and Network Rail Routes. However, its content may also be of use to others.

Issue record

Issue	Date	Comments
One	December 2011	Issued to TOCs. Network Rail sign off awaited.
Two	February 2012	Re-issued with amendments following Network Rail review.
Three	June 2014	Re-issued (as a Guidance Note rather than Good Practice Guide) following general view. Appendix D added.
Four	June 2019	Periodic review and in light of experiences during bad weather experienced in February - March 2018. Document re-titled from 'Meeting the Needs of Passengers when Trains are Stranded' to 'Meeting the Needs of Passengers Stranded on Trains'.

Contents

Part 1 About this document

1.1 Responsibilities

1.1.1 Copies of this Guidance Note should be distributed by RDG members to persons within their respective organisations for whom its content is relevant.

1.2 Explanatory note

1.2.1 RDG produces RDG Guidance Notes for the information of its members. RDG is not a regulatory body and compliance with RDG Guidance Notes is not mandatory.

1.2.2 RDG Guidance Notes are intended to reflect good practice. RDG members are recommended to evaluate the guidance against their own arrangements in a structured and systematic way. Some or all parts of the guidance may not be appropriate to their operations. It is recommended that this process of evaluation and any subsequent decision to adopt (or not to adopt) elements of the guidance should be documented.

1.3 Guidance Note status

1.3.1 This document is not intended to create legally binding obligations between railway duty holders and should be binding in honour only.

1.4 Supply

1.4.1 Copies of this Guidance Note may be obtained from the RDG members' web site or the Network Rail Professional Head of Operations.

Part 2 Purpose and scope

2.1 Purpose

2.1.1 The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to enable Network Rail (as the infrastructure manager) and railway undertakings to plan for and implement appropriate arrangements to meet the needs of passengers who are stranded on trains. Failure to provide adequate care for people stranded leaves the industry exposed to high profile criticism, reputational damage and potential loss of future business, as well as giving rise to potentially dangerous passenger behaviour.

2.1.2 In order to ensure that passengers who become stranded on trains suffer the minimum of potential risks to their health and safety, delay, inconvenience, frustration, discomfort and security is maintained, the rail industry must take and keep control of and manage the situation in a way which not only meets reasonable needs but also shows care and competence. Included within this is the need to provide support to traincrew and other on-board staff to help ensure that they are able to look after people who are in their care.

2.1.3 How passengers feel is of utmost importance - if they feel "the railway" does not care and is not responding adequately to their needs, experience shows that they are liable to take matters into their own hands. An obvious possible consequence of this is self-evacuation, which – if it occurs where a train is not at a platform - creates risks to their own and other people's safety and will make the situation both more difficult to manage and likely to take longer to resolve.

2.1.4 Railway undertakings vary considerably in the nature of their operations – the geographical areas served, the types of service provided, the number of on-board staff and the numbers and types of passenger carried. There can be no single definitive plan for managing the consequences for passengers stranded on trains and this Guidance Note does not attempt to provide one. It is intended to assist Network Rail Routes and railway undertakings in putting together their individual response plans specific to their own circumstances by identifying the various factors, challenges and options that need to be considered when developing and implementing them. As part of this, it is recommended that Network Rail Routes and railway undertakings develop a 'Protocol for Stranded Trains' which sets out the key principles, roles and responsibilities and which can be immediately referred to in stranded train situations – a basic example of such a Protocol has been provided as Appendix C.

2.1.5 While acknowledging that a 'one size fits all' approach is not possible, this Guidance Note does seek to encourage consistency of approach where this is helpful in providing the necessary confidence on the part of passengers, operational staff and society that the rail industry is able and willing to manage situations when trains become stranded. In particular, there is a need to broaden the focus of the response away from purely railway operating considerations to include what the passenger needs/how they feel – in other words *looking after passengers* rather than focusing solely on *assisting trains*.

2.1.6 Network Rail Routes and railway undertakings should review their own individual response plans against the contents of this Guidance Note to the extent that the latter are applicable to their own situation.

2.2 Scope

2.2.1 This Guidance Note applies to all members of the RDG Train Operators Operations Scheme and Network Rail and is also made available for anyone else who wishes to use it.

Part 3 Other sources of information and advice

3.1 Rail industry documents

3.1.1 The following rail industry (i.e. Network Rail, RDG - including former ATOC - and RSSB) documents include content that is relevant to the management of stranded trains and the passengers on them. Where appropriate, specific cross-references are provided within the text of this Guidance Note.

i) Network Rail document:

National Operating Instructions - NR/L3/OPS/045/4.15 [Issue: 2] Managing Stranded Trains and Train Evacuation

ii) RDG (including former ATOC) documents:

The following ATOC/RDG Approved Codes of Practice/Guidance Notes:

- ATOC/ACOP014 – Provision of Customer Information
- RDG-GN015 - Extreme Weather Arrangements, including Failure or Non-Availability of On-Train Environment Control Systems RDG-GN016 – Competence of Train Operator Liaison Officers (TOLOs)

The above are available from the RSSB Standards Catalogue (https://www.rssb.co.uk/railway-group-standards) and the RDG members' website.

The Customer Information Projects Board (formerly the Information Development Group) Good Practice Guides for Customer Information – section 4 covers information on train

(http://www.nationalrail.co.uk/static/documents/GPG_v3.0_-_Final.pdf).

iii) RSSB documents and reports:

Railway Group Standards and associated Guidance, in particular:

- GERT8000 – Rule Book
- GM/RC2534 – Recommendations for Rail Vehicle Emergency Evacuation
- RIS-3118-TOM – Incident Response Planning & Management

- GO/GN3518 – Guidance on Incident Response Planning & Management

All the above are available from the RSSB Standards Catalogue (https://www.rssb.co.uk/railway-group-standards).

Research reports:

- T626 - Research into the management of passengers on trains stranded in high ambient temperatures

  https://www.rssb.co.uk/research-development-and-innovation/research-project-catalogue/t626

- T1065 - Identifying and developing good practice for making on-train announcements in the event of an incident

  https://www.rssb.co.uk/Pages/research-catalogue/T1065.aspx

Plus any railway undertaking specific plans.

3.2 Other documents

3.2.1 Further relevant information may also be found in the following external documents:

- Emergency Response & Recovery – Non-Statutory Guidance Accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/Emergency_Response_and_Recovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf

- Identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis: guidance for emergency planners and responders

  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/identifying-people-who-are-vulnerable-in-a-crisis-guidance-for-emergency-planners-and-responders

Part 4 Definitions and abbreviations

4.1 Important note

4.1.1 Within the following definitions and throughout the rest of this Guidance Note, references to MOM, RCM and RIO should be taken to refer to whoever is performing these roles – this may be by other posts within Network Rail who hold the required competence.

4.2 Key definitions applicable to this Guidance Note are as follows:

4.2.1 Within this Code, the following terms have the meanings below.

i) **ACOP**

Approved Code of Practice.

ii) **Assisting train/locomotive**

A train or locomotive used or intended to be used to move a stranded train.

iii) **CSL2**

Customer Service Level 2 (as described in ATOC/ACOP014 – Provision of Customer Information).

iv) **DOO**

Driver Only Operated.

v) **GSM-R**

Global System for Mobile Communications – Railway.

vi) **JESIP**

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles – a programme aimed at improving the way the Police, Fire & Rescue and Ambulance Services work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents. A key output from this was a standard approach ('Joint Doctrine'). These principles will be adhered to when the rail industry requests the involvement of any of the emergency services, irrespective of whether or not a major incident has been declared. See https://www.jesip.org.uk/home for further information.

vii) **LRF**

Local Resilience Forum. An LRF is a forum formed in a police area by key emergency responders and specific supporting agencies. It is a requirement of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. An LRF provides a means through which responders can discuss, consult, collaborate and disclose information with each other to facilitate planning and response to emergencies and produce a Community Risk Register.

viii) **MOM**

Mobile Operations Manager.

ix) **NRCC**

National Rail Communication Centre. The NRCC is responsible for disseminating contextual information surrounding disruptions, ensuring that this information is accurate, consistent and complete and is available to customers through numerous channels. The NRCC is primarily provided with information from TOCs and plays a supporting role in passing this on to customers.

x) **NRE**

National Rail Enquiries.

xi) **OLE**

Overhead Line Equipment.

xii) **On-board staff**

Staff, including contractors (such as catering or cleaning staff), on board a train other than members of the traincrew. For the purpose of this document, this includes any other members of rail staff, whether of the railway undertaking concerned or the wider industry and whether on duty or not, who can be called on to provide assistance to members of the traincrew.

xiii) **PA**

Public address.

xiv) **Particularly vulnerable passengers**

It should be recognised that in the event of a train becoming stranded for an extended period, all passengers on it potentially become 'vulnerable' in that they are in a degraded situation over which they have very little control, are hence reliant on others and may, in addition, be under considerable stress. For the purpose of this document, the term 'particularly vulnerable passenger' is therefore used to mean any passengers who may be unable to hear/see/understand announcements/messages and/or who may have difficulty in following instructions. Specifically, this includes those who

a) Have a disability or long term health problem which means that they may need particular help or assistance if a train becomes stranded (including, for example, insulin dependent people with diabetes, etc).

b) Are unaccompanied children/young persons

c) Are unaccompanied elderly persons

d) Do not understand English or due to either a sensory or cognitive impairment are unable to hear or follow instructions from traincrew/on-board staff.

e) Are pregnant or who may need additional help evacuating the train.

f) Are travelling with infants/young children.

g) Become or may become temporarily ill or unwell whilst the train is stranded.

h) Whose judgement may be impaired as a result of drug or alcohol consumption.

It should be noted that the number of particularly vulnerable passengers is likely to increase as delays extend.

xv) **PIDD**

Passenger Information During Disruption. During times of disruption, one of the greatest passenger needs is information that is Clear, Consistent, Correct and Concise. PIDD is the term under which all passenger information actions are captured in this document.

xvi) **RCM**

Route Control Manager.

xvii) **Rescue train**

A train used or intended to be used to effect evacuation of passengers from a stranded train.

xviii) **RIO**

Rail Incident Officer.

xix) **Stranded passengers**

Passengers on, or who have been evacuated from a stranded train through planned evacuation (note that this does not include those who have self-evacuated who are technically trespassers). Passengers stranded at a station are outside the scope of this Guidance Note *except* where they have been taken to the station following evacuation from a stranded train (where the provisions of this document continue to apply until such time as they have completed their intended journey).

xx) **Stranded train**

For a train to qualify as stranded and hence be subject to the provisions of this Guidance Note, the following criteria must be met:

a) The train must be stationary[1] other than as scheduled[2]; and

b) It is established that

Either there is no reasonable certainty that it will resume its journey within the next X minutes.

Or there is reasonable certainty that it will resume its journey but only after a delay of at least Y minutes (since coming to stand).

Proportionate to the circumstances, railway undertakings should liaise and agree with Network Rail (as infrastructure manager) the values of X

[1] If a train is able to make only very slow progress, i.e. less than walking speed, for an extended period it should be regarded as stationary in respect of the content of this Guidance Note

[2] For a train not conveying passengers only Section 6 of this Guide applies. For trains conveying passengers all provisions within this Guide apply

and Y to be applied – it is suggested that a default value of 10 be used for X and of 30 for Y.

xxi) **TOLO**

Train Operator Liaison Officer.

xxii) **Traincrew**

Drivers and, where provided, guards/senior conductors/on-board train managers.

xxiii) **Tyrell**

The information messaging service as provided by Nexus Alpha and used by many TOCs within the industry for dissemination of real time information relating to train services.

xxiv) **Unexpected stop**

Any stop made by a train at a location which is both unexpected and unusual. This includes at stations at which the train is not booked to call (and for which no Special Stop Order has been issued), on running lines other than at signals and at signals unusually displaying a stop aspect. It is the responsibility of the guard/senior conductor (driver in the case of DOO services) to determine whether a stop is unexpected and therefore whether the provisions within Part 8.2.2 apply.

Part 5 Summary of key requirements

5.1 Key principles for rail industry response

5.1.1 In the event of one or more trains becoming stranded, our response as "the railway" needs to be guided by the following:

i) *Preventing the situation becoming worse* – this includes responding to situational awareness by taking immediate action to prevent or limit any escalation, e.g. by holding other trains back at stations outside the affected area rather than allowing them to approach, or diverting them to an alternative route. This should include application of rules or through dynamic risk assessment.

ii) *How best to meet the needs and expectations of the passengers on board* – broadly the choice here is likely to be between i) holding passengers on the train until the situation has been resolved (i.e. the train is able to continue its journey or has been assisted) or ii) evacuating the passengers (either directly to a station platform or rescue train or via a track access point). Passenger related considerations (including the effects on passengers on other trains which may be affected) should always take precedence over railway operational factors.

iii) *How to gain/maintain control of the situation* – by demonstrating care, empathy, competence and confidence.

iv) Avoiding relying exclusively on a single plan.

v) *Discipline of decision making* – there may be a temptation to defer key decisions in the belief that the situation will improve or that new information will become available. In practice, it is better to initiate an early full activation of the response plan and subsequently stand down resources than it is to ramp up the response as a degraded situation evolves into a crisis. In essence, the principle should be to plan for the worst while hoping for the best.

vi) In order to assist the decision making process, it is recommended that a decision making model be adopted.

5.1.2 The three biggest challenges faced in adhering to the above are likely to be:

i) *Lack of information* – Parts 7 and 8 identify the various factors that need to be taken into account when determining the best course of action to take in the event of a train or trains becoming stranded. Essentially this decision needs to be informed by a dynamic risk assessment but very rarely will all relevant facts be known so there will also need to be an element of judgement. Once a particular path of action has been embarked upon, it will often be difficult to change tack - this is not an excuse for not acting but an imperative to act decisively.

ii) *Cultural* change – the challenge of shifting the focus of the response away from railway operating considerations to meeting the needs of stranded passengers should not be underestimated. As an industry we do not always have a strong “think customer first” culture, but staff showing empathy, responsiveness and confidence in their competence will provide reassurance. It is strongly recommended that a senior manager is specifically assigned to ‘think passenger need’ (see Part 7.3). More generally, the buy-in of all relevant staff is needed if this is to be achieved

and applied, including those who are not usually called on to interact directly with passengers, such as signalling and control office staff whose line managers therefore also have an important role to play.

iii) *Competence and particularly experience* – Instances of significant numbers of passengers being stranded on trains are comparatively rare. In the absence of first-hand experience, adequate testing and exercising of operational scenarios involving stranded passengers become essential to developing and maintaining competence.

5.1.3 In developing arrangements to meet the needs of passengers stranded on trains, it is recommended that the following be explicitly considered:

i) *Number of trains involved* – it is recommended that railway undertakings and Network Rail identify a 'worst case scenario' in terms of the number of trains that could plausibly become stranded by a credible failure (such as a widespread power or signalling system outage) and then review their response plans to check the adequacy of these for addressing such a scenario.

ii) *Number of passengers involved* – as with the number of trains, railway undertakings and Network Rail should identify a reasonable 'worst case scenario' in terms both of the maximum number of passengers that may be stranded on a single train and the maximum total number that may be stranded and check the viability of their plans accordingly.

iii) *Type of train involved* – this should take into account such factors as the number and type of toilets, on train environmental control systems or lack thereof, ability to open external windows, provision of refreshments, etc.

5.2 Stranding of passengers on multiple trains

5.2.1 The report commissioned jointly by Network Rail South East Route and the Southeastern TOC into the multiple stranding of trains during the 'Beast from the East' adverse weather at the beginning of March 2018[3] notes that '*Stranding incidents involving multiple trains are not fundamentally different from those involving a single train but are inherently more complex to manage.'*

[3] Arthur D. Little – '*Independent investigation into the circumstances around multiple stranded trains and passenger self-evacuation to track in the Lewisham and new cross area in the evening of 2 March 2018*', published August 2018

5.2.2 The report makes reference to an example of signaller-driver communication where one signaller had to communicate with the drivers of nine separate trains. Communications will be further complicated by the need for multiple MOMs and TOLOs and the conflicting priorities that these will face between responding to operations related demands and providing support to stranded passengers.

5.2.3 Network Rail and railway undertakings need to appreciate that the challenges of managing an incident involving multiple stranded trains tend to increase exponentially with the number of trains involved, be alert to such a situation developing and take early steps to escalate the response accordingly.

Part 6 Recognising when a train has become stranded

6.1 Initial awareness

6.1.1 In many cases, it is the signaller who will be the first person (other, possibly, than those on board) to become aware that a train has become or is likely to become stranded. It is the responsibility of the signaller to alert the Route Control, and through it the railway undertaking concerned, to this. The logic for this is as follows:

i) Train brought to a stand by signaller due to known failure or non-availability of the infrastructure (including security alerts). In this case the signaller is already aware of the problem and therefore best able to assess both the extent and predictability of any delay.

ii) Train brought to stand by driver as a result of an apparent failure or non-availability of the infrastructure. In this case, based on the information provided by the driver the signaller is still best placed to assess both the extent and predictability of any delay (from previous experience, knowledge of how long it will take to arrange for the line to be examined, etc.).

6.1.2 The exception is where the train is brought to a stand by driver as a result of a failure or incident affecting the train. Here, though the driver will be better placed than the signaller to assess the seriousness of the failure/incident as far as their own train is concerned, the signaller will be better able to consider the implications and options available (e.g. the availability of potential assisting or rescue locomotives/trains, the time taken to deploy the emergency services/RIO/TOLO etc.).

6.1.3 Network Rail should ensure that its signallers are alert to the need to recognise situations in which passengers become or are likely to become stranded on trains, including when a train is moving abnormally slowly for an extended period (see footnote to definition of 'stranded train' in Part 4.1) and report the fact accordingly. Railway undertakings should ensure that their drivers are similarly alert to the need to highlight this possibility when communicating with signallers.

6.1.4 This requirement applies to all trains on all passenger routes, irrespective of whether the train concerned is conveying passengers, as even where this is not the case, there is potential for a knock-on effect on other services which may themselves become stranded as a result. For a table showing the possible causes of a train or trains becoming stranded and an indication of who is likely to become aware of the circumstances first, please see Appendix A.

6.1.5 The signaller will also comply with the immediate requirements set out in Part 10.1.1 to prevent further trains becoming stranded.

6.2 Trains stranded at stations

6.2.1 Should a train become stranded at a station, whether or not this is a booked calling point of the train concerned, then an assessment of the facilities available at the station, including staffing levels, should be undertaken to determine the extent to which it is able to meet reasonable customer needs and what additional resources are required to fully meet the requirements set out in this Guidance Note. This should take into account the circumstances at the time and what changes are expected in these (e.g. the arrival of further services which become stranded at the station, predicted changes in weather conditions, etc.).

Part 7 Determining the most appropriate response

7.1 Introduction

7.1.1 Identifying how the needs and expectations of passengers on board stranded trains can best be met requires a risk assessment to be undertaken, based on the information available at the time but recognising that the initial assessment will need to be refined and the response adjusted as further information becomes available.

7.1.2 Ultimate responsibility for conducting the risk assessment should lie with the Control (if integrated) or jointly with the railway undertaking and Network Rail Controls. However, input from traincrew and other staff on site will be critical in providing Control with the situational awareness needed to inform the risk assessment.

7.1.3 The most fundamental decision is likely to be whether to seek to hold passengers on board the train until it can be moved or set in motion arrangements for them to be evacuated. A key objective which should be explicitly considered as part of the decision making process is the need to reduce the risk of passengers self-evacuating as this serves to exacerbate the situation further. Protecting the health and safety of passengers should be a key objective. Evacuation is considered further in Part 11.

7.1.4 The safest option will usually be for passengers to remain on the train. However, there is clear evidence of a growing propensity of passengers to self-evacuate. How soon this becomes a significant risk will be dependent on a number of factors, but it is clear that the viability of containing passengers on the train will diminish as the length of time for which the train has been stationary increases.

7.1.5 Immediately it is judged to be likely that passengers will start to self-evacuate (based on feedback and advice from traincrew and other staff on site), they should be advised to remain on board and that a safe resolution of the situation is being developed. While the conditions for a controlled evacuation may be less than ideal, this option will always be preferable to an uncontrolled self-evacuation (subject to ensuring that key conditions such as ensuring that all train movements on adjacent tracks have been stopped and that the traction current on 3rd rail equipped routes has been switched off have been met).

7.1.6 The risk assessment should be seen as a tool to assist rather than determine the decision making – as such it should complement rather than replace the judgement of those with relevant experience.

7.2 Immediate action

7.2.1 In addition to the signaller taking immediate appropriate action to avoid other trains becoming trapped as a result of the stranded train (see Part 10.1.1), Network Rail and the railway undertaking(s) concerned should immediately implement the appropriate incident command structure.

7.2.2 This should generally include deployment of a RIO, who may be supported by one or more MOMs, by Network Rail and TOLO by the railway undertaking to the site. Where more than a single train is stranded, additional MOMs and TOLOs should be deployed – ideally each stranded train should be assigned its own dedicated MOM and TOLO, though it is recognised that lack of availability of suitable resources may prevent this. See Part 10 for a more detailed description of roles and responsibilities.

7.2.3 Early consideration should be given to the availability of external resources which can potentially be called upon to assist – see Part 13).

7.2.4 This should include the emergency services who should be alerted if it is apparent that the incident is serious or has the potential to rapidly escalate into one which is serious.

7.3 Factors to be taken into account

7.3.1 To the extent that reliable information is available, the stranded passengers structured dynamic risk assessment should take into account the following factors:

i) *Reason for the stranding* – while this may influence passenger needs and how easily these are met, the biggest impact is likely to be on the options available. For example, there are likely to be more possibilities for assisting a train that has suffered a simple mechanical failure than one trapped by extensive flooding.

ii) *Duration* – where the duration of the incident causing the train(s) to be stranded can be foreseen with a reasonable degree of certainty this will clearly influence the response. However, as noted above (Part 5), decision making must not be delayed until such time as the likely duration is established.

iii) *Generic types of passengers involved* – the type of passenger on the train or trains concerned (whether frequent or infrequent travellers, type and length of journey being made, etc.) will influence such factors as how much reassurance will be needed, whether the amount of luggage is likely to be a major issue should evacuation be required and even what

percentage of passengers are likely to have brought their own supplies of food and drink with them. Perhaps most significantly, it also influences the propensity of passengers to self-evacuate. Passengers making long distance journeys on a train which has become stranded many tens (or hundreds) of miles from their destination have little incentive to do so. But commuters making shorter journeys and knowing that there is a station 400 metres down the track from which they can be picked up or make alternative arrangements to get home or to work may be quick to take matters into their own hands. Previous experience also indicates that passengers in the London area tend to be quicker to start to self-evacuate than those elsewhere in the country.

iv) *Attributes of individual passengers involved* – the number of passengers with specific needs and the nature of these. Such needs may be associated with physical and/or mental impairment, ethnicity/diversity considerations, understanding of English, etc.

It should also be remembered that the Assisted Passenger Reservation System can provide details of any passengers requiring (pre-booked) special assistance who are travelling on the train.

v) *Number/type of staff on board the train* – this will determine how much and what form of extra support needs to be provided to the train/traincrew and will also be a factor when considering the practicality of evacuation. DOO services with no other staff members on board present particular challenges (see Part 12).

vi) *The ability to provide information to passengers on the stranded train* – see Part 8.3.

vii) *External media/peer group influences* – passengers are more likely to be conscious of the option to self-evacuate – and do so – if they are aware of other self-evacuations, either taking place concurrently or which have done so recently. Such awareness may originate from a number of sources – personal messages, social media and more general media reporting.

viii) *External conditions: geography* – the exact location at which the train is stranded relative to cuttings, embankments, tunnels, viaducts, etc. clearly affects the ease with which evacuation to or via the track can be achieved as do such factors as whether it is on single or double/multiple track and the suitability of the ballast for alighting onto/walking on (e.g. cant deficiency). Where the train is at a location at which it is possible for passengers on board to alight easily and continue their journeys by other

means, i.e. at least a part of the train to which all passengers have access (by walking through the train if necessary) is alongside a usable platform at a station reasonably able to accommodate them and from which alternative road or rail transport can be readily provided, then the majority of the other provisions of this Guidance Note need not apply.

Railway geography will also determine the ease with which an assisting train or locomotive can be deployed while track geometry will affect the options for train to train evacuation.

Attention also needs to be given to what is to be done with passengers once evacuated from the train. If it is not at a platform, the distance to the nearest station or access point to the railway (such as a level crossing) is also of significance and beyond this the overall remoteness will affect the ease of providing assistance to those evacuated in the form of replacement road vehicles, refreshments, rest/reception areas, etc.

ix) *External conditions: weather* – the most immediate considerations are external air temperatures and the degree of sunlight shining directly on the train as potentially these have a direct impact on conditions inside the train, particularly if on train heating/air conditioning/ventilation systems are inoperative. If evacuation to or via the track is being contemplated then additional considerations apply – wind speed, precipitation, fog and ground conditions (i.e. wet or presence/depth of snow/ice/frost).

x) *External conditions: level of light* – for many, being stranded on a train during hours of darkness may contribute to stress levels, particularly if on-board lighting has failed. Similar issues apply if a train is trapped in a tunnel, where passengers prone to claustrophobia will be particularly vulnerable. In both scenarios evacuation to or via trackside is likely to be considerably more difficult than would otherwise be the case.

In this context, RSSB research into train evacuation in emergencies showed that complete absence of light is very disconcerting to many people and conversely even very limited amounts of light, such as that created by mobile phones, are very reassuring. On trains without power, traincrew should seek to turn off most of the train lighting, leaving only minimal lighting in each carriage, to conserve battery power as long as possible.

xi) *Internal conditions* – though there will be exceptions, conditions on board the train should generally be the single most important factor influencing the decision on how best to respond. There are two particularly critical elements. The first of these is the temperature/quality/humidity of air on

the train. The speed at which in the event of inoperative air conditioning the on-board environment can deteriorate during hot or even warm weather - especially on a heavily-loaded train - from one which is simply unpleasant to one which poses significant risks to health (and hence escalates the incident into a full-scale emergency) should not be under-estimated. Conversely, the ventilation effect of opening external doors and normally sealed windows should not be over-estimated. It is therefore recommended that in all such cases, preparations for evacuation should begin immediately the situation becomes apparent. The second concerns the availability of toilet facilities. For many people, including young children and those with certain medical conditions, even 2 hours without access to a working toilet may be very problematic, hence it is recommended that the objective should be to ensure that no passenger is stranded on a train without functioning toilet facilities for more than 60 minutes.

Other factors that should be taken into account are the availability of drinks/refreshments and the ability to communicate with passengers.

xii) *Availability of suitable assisting locomotives/train* – A realistic assessment of the time within which a stranded train can be assisted by a train or locomotive needs to be made. This needs to take into account the location of any such locomotives/trains relative to the stranded train (and with which they must be compatible), sourcing of associated traincrew, special equipment (such as emergency couplings) and the availability of the necessary infrastructure to permit the assisting train or locomotive to reach that which is stranded (in some cases, for example where a train is stranded as a result of flooding or overhead wires have fallen onto the track, such assistance may not be an option). Assistance of the train should only be seen as the primary response when there is confidence that the needs of passengers on board the train can be adequately met until the assistance can be effected.

xiii) *Availability of staff* – The availability of staff both to assist during the evacuation and provide on-going support while they are awaiting onward transport should be considered when formulating a controlled evacuation plan as this may influence the choice of the precise evacuation point and the timing.

xiv) *Provision of rescue train* – an alternative to evacuating stranded passengers to the trackside is to transfer them to a rescue train. This may be achieved by i) drawing a second train alongside (using 'bridges' or via the track) or ii) bringing a train to the front or rear and then either walking

passengers through (where corridor connections allow) or else transferring them via the track. As for assisting trains or locomotives above, an assessment is needed of the practicality (including realistic timescales) of this option, taking into account all factors.

xv) *Availability/suitability of alternative onward transport* – this should include consideration of the expected time to mobilise such transport, including the logistics and practicality of it being able to reach the nearest or other available access point.

Use of the Rule Book - full use should be made of the provisions included within the Rule Book for the movement of trains in degraded situations, particularly to enable trains to reach platforms.

7.4 Scale of incident

7.4.1 Stranded train incidents can range from a small number of passengers stranded on a single train with fully functioning heating/air conditioning and several members of traincrew/on-board staff to multiple crowded trains losing power during the middle of a heat wave. Network Rail/railway undertaking response plans need to be flexible enough to address both. While each incident will be unique, a simple three-way classification (large/medium/small, major/intermediate/minor, red/orange/ yellow, etc.) may prove helpful as a means of enabling all concerned to gain an immediate appreciation of the overall scale of the problem and also in acting as a trigger for incremental parts of the response plan. It is recommended that for all major and intermediate scale stranded trains incidents a senior manager is assigned the specific responsibility to 'think passenger' and ensure that how best to meet passenger needs is properly reflected and influential in the decision making process.

Appendix B provides an example of how various risk factors may be assessed and weighted to determine the scale of the incident.

7.5 Resilience of contingency arrangements

7.5.1 Wherever possible, Network Rail Routes and railway undertakings responding to stranded trains/passengers incidents should not rely on a single contingency plan but instead aim to have alternative options in place or in the process of being implemented so as to provide resilience. These should be planned in parallel with the preferred option.

Part 8 Passenger needs and expectations

8.1 Introduction

8.1.1 Railway undertakings are responsible for the safety, security and welfare of their passengers. At times of serious disruption, passenger needs typically increase - initially around information and reassurance, with physical requirements such as food, drink and access to toilets then assuming greater importance as delays extend. They may also change in character from generic (Is the train on time?) to personal (Am I going to make my connection? Am I going to be back in time to collect my child from nursery?). And just as meeting these passenger needs becomes more demanding, the industry's ability to meet them is compromised – the traincrew often becoming by default the only channel through which the industry can communicate directly with its passengers and sometimes being poorly equipped to fulfil this role.

8.1.2 Organisation response plans should therefore explicitly consider how to:

i) Anticipate and best provide for the emerging needs of stranded passengers.

ii) Influence and manage the expectations of stranded passengers.

iii) Prepare and equip traincrew to assist with the above.

8.1.3 The following sections describe in more detail the various needs of stranded passengers and how these might be met. Rather than undertaking all the associated tasks themselves, traincrew should be encouraged to enlist others on board the train to assist as necessary. In order of priority/preference this should comprise:

i) On-board staff of their own railway undertaking (including contractors).

ii) Other rail industry staff.

iii) Persons with relevant professional knowledge (e.g. those with medical expertise).

iv) Police and fire officers.

v) Other persons who may be suitable (i.e. with relevant skills, experience, personal authority, etc.).

8.1.4 Network Rail and railway undertakings should encourage all their staff to offer to assist the traincrew should they be on a train which becomes stranded.

8.1.5 It should be noted that while the following sections for the most part focus on meeting the needs of passengers stranded on a train, these same needs continue to a greater or lesser extent once passengers have been evacuated from the train. Railway undertaking plans need to recognise this explicitly and take this into account (see also Part 8.9).

8.2 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – introduction/hierarchy of needs

8.2.1 The following hierarchy of needs on the part of passengers trapped on a stranded train has been identified:

i) Supervision/information/reassurance

ii) Heating/air conditioning

iii) Light

iv) Particularly vulnerable people

v) Access to toilet

vi) Drink

vii) Food

viii) Greet/meet

ix) Post-event

8.2.2 This list is both in descending order of importance and broadly aligned with the length of the delay, i.e. supervision/reassurance, the maintenance of a minimum level of lighting and a reasonable on-board temperature are all immediate needs while those for food and drink become significant only after an extended period. Each of these needs is discussed in more detail in the following sections.

8.3 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – supervision/information/reassurance

8.3.1 The single biggest need for stranded passengers, at least initially, is for information – even if the information is not good news. It should be provided proactively and follow the good practices defined in the appropriate PIDD guidance. In addition to the actual factual content (which may be fairly minimal, at least in the early stages), provision of information on a regular basis is also a very powerful means of providing reassurance to passengers that 'the railway' remains in control and is actively engaged in attempting to resolve the problem, thus dissuading them from taking matters into their own hands.

8.3.2 It is recommended that the following information be provided:

i) Unexpected stop

In the event of an unexpected stop, the provisions of Part 4.2 of the 'Good Practice Guides for Customer Information' produced by the Information Development Group (maintained by the Customer Information Projects Board) apply:

a) An announcement (the 'disruption icebreaker') should be made within two minutes, even if the reason is not known at that point.

b) A further announcement to be made as soon as further information on the reason for the stop and likely consequences is known.

c) These announcements are about assurance and confidence – even if nothing more is known the content and style of the announcement is likely to be the biggest factor in managing passenger behaviour and business reputation.

ii) Continuing delay

In the event that the train continues to be at a stand, further announcements should be made by a member of the traincrew or other on-board staff whenever new information suitable for informing and/or reassuring passengers becomes available. The Information Development Group document referred to above requires that even when no new

information is available, staff must be demonstrating empathy and providing reassurance and confidence, with announcements continuing to be made regularly and at intervals of no more than 10 minutes.

iii) Dissuading passengers from self-evacuating

Where traincrew or on-board staff believe there is a risk of passengers self-evacuating, all reasonable efforts to prevent this should be made. This should include making announcements highlighting the risks of such action – dangers from moving trains, power cables, weather and ground conditions, presence of the 3rd rail, etc. as appropriate - and stressing to passengers that their safest option is to remain on the train. If there is suitable and sufficient relevant dialogue with passengers, this risk is lowered.

iv) Use of recorded announcements

Pre-recorded announcements should generally not be used to communicate to stranded passengers - people want to know someone cares and is in charge. However, as safety critical actions need to take precedence over the making of announcements during the initial stages of an incident, use of automated announcements at this stage may be considered – it is better that passengers receive an automated announcement to the effect that the delay is being investigated than no announcement at all.

v) Use of on train PIS

Railway undertakings should consider whether and if so how use can be made of on-board Customer Information Systems to communicate real time information to supplement manual announcements.

vi) Use of social networking channels

Many passengers are using various digital methods to communicate directly with people (including railway undertaking information offices) outside the train and increasingly to access, exchange information and make comments on social networking sites so are no longer reliant solely on information provided by on-board staff. Indeed, they may well have access to rather more information than have on-board staff, though the accuracy of this may be variable.

It is therefore vitally important that as much information as possible is made available via these forms of media, not least because if there is no "official" source of information passengers will often communicate

amongst themselves and this can sometimes lead to an incorrect or misleading perception of what is actually occurring.

While there are a variety of such channels, that by far the most likely to be used by passengers in real time is Twitter and it is recommended that all railway undertakings should not only have a Twitter account but also arrangements in place to monitor and respond to Twitter messages in real time during periods of disruption.

Railway undertaking Twitter accounts should be regularly updated with the latest information about the incident. It should be acknowledged that trains are stranded, confirmation given of the specific trains involved and an estimate provided of when both individual trains and services more generally will be on the move.

If it is likely that trains will be stranded for a significant time, this needs to be made clear to passengers from the outset, together with information about what is being done both to get trains moving (or the passengers evacuated from them) and to provide assistance to passengers on board the train(s) meanwhile.

National Rail Enquiries' national account (@nationalrailenq) is managed 24/7 by the National Rail Communication Centre (NRCC) in Doncaster. It is crucial that effective communication is maintained with the NRCC (e.g. via Tyrell and other messaging systems) to ensure that the Twitter accounts are kept up-to-date with changing developments and that individual replies can be sent to passengers.

Inbound questions from passengers should be responded to and assurance should be given about onward travel arrangements in the event of connections being missed, etc.

In addition to sending/responding to messages, railway undertakings should also actively monitor Twitter to see what is being said by passengers affected by the disruption and indeed by those on stranded trains. This will often give an indication of the "mood" on board the train and whether passenger needs are being met, including for those who have special needs (e.g. medication). Where possible those sending such messages should be asked specifically about conditions on board, which coach they are in, etc. Attempts should be made to substantiate any significant information so provided, either by asking on-board staff or, where this is not possible/practical, other passengers on the train.

By monitoring Twitter, it may be possible to obtain an "early warning" as to whether passengers have disembarked from the train or are likely to do so. Suitable messages can then be sent to discourage them from taking this course of action.

Meeters and greeters will often use Twitter to monitor what is happening and again it is important that they are kept fully up-to-date.

ailway undertakings and Network Rail should train their social media teams specifically in their policies on the management of stranded trains and the questions to ask those on board. This should include ensuring they are alert to significant information and the need to pass this to the relevant Control office without delay. Similar training should be provided to relevant NRCC staff.

Further information relating to social channels and responses to major disruption can be found within RDG's Guidance Note 'RDG-GN039 Issue 1 - Social Media Response to Major Incidents and Disruptive Events'.

vii) Websites

Whilst Twitter and other social media sites are important channels of communication, their take up is not universal and many passengers will continue to want to use railway undertaking and the NRE websites to obtain information.

As with Twitter, it is vital that websites are kept up-to-date to the minute, even if the message is that the situation hasn't changed – the stranded passengers and people waiting for them need to know "the railway" is in control and has a plan. The NRCC should be on the standard distribution list for all updates so that the National Rail Enquiries website can be updated in real-time. This is particularly important as many railway undertakings now use a direct feed from NRE to update their own sites. Messages should be updated in line with the PIDD ACOP, i.e. no less than every 20 minutes, unless there is a 'steady state' situation.

viii) Telephone contact

Some passengers, for example those without smart-phones, will prefer to call either National Rail Enquiries or railway undertaking customer service departments for updates. The NRE contact centres are updated by the NRCC so it is vital that the NRCC is kept fully up-to-date with the latest developments.

Those at stations meeting arriving passengers will often use help points to ascertain what is occurring and when a train is likely to arrive. It is therefore vital that those staffing the help points are provided with the latest information.

Railway undertakings should have pre-agreed plans in place that allow them to extend the opening hours of their customer service centres in the event of disruption occurring at a time when they would otherwise be closed.

ix) Use of Darwin

Where trains become delayed or stranded, and there is a reasonable estimate of when they are likely to be moving, this information should be communicated to Darwin (the National Real Time Database) so that passengers and those meeting them at stations who use Live Departure Boards and other real-time journey planning tools can see the estimated delay and have their expectations managed accordingly.

In addition, a feature within Darwin provides TOCs with the ability to apply an 'ad-hoc' alert specific to a train. TOCs should adopt using this functionality so that customers can benefit from specific information pertaining to them.

x) Stranded passengers once removed from the train

If passengers are removed from a stranded train, arrangements for maintaining contact with them should be identified and put in place. If they are evacuated onto another train or to a station, use can be made of the associated communication systems. If they are evacuated to trackside, a public highway or local authority care then special provision to maintain communications with them will need to be made.

In addition, staff should be deployed to evacuation points to provide support for passengers awaiting onward transport.

The Darwin functionality referred to above is also applicable here.

xi) Generic considerations re information provision

Reference should be made to the content of the 'Good Practice Guides for Customer Information' produced by the Information Development Group.

Where information is incomplete or imprecise it should still be passed on with suitable explanation of its limitations. This is vital in providing reassurance to passengers that efforts are continuing to rectify the situation and that "the railway" cares and is in control. Example: 'Ladies and gentlemen, a locomotive to assist our train is now on its way. We are hoping that it will be here within 30 minutes or so. I will have more definite information for you on this shortly.'

As with all passenger announcements, use of railway jargon and technical terms must be avoided and instead use made of every day words and phrases. Points, track circuits, "TPWS" etc., mean nothing to passengers and use of them shows we are not thinking about their needs. The Tyrell system includes a number of standard phrases and announcements should conform to these – further information is provided in Appendix A to the Good Practice Guide for Customer Information.

Information provided, whether by on-board staff, at stations, via social media/websites, Tyrell messages or the NRCC, should always be consistent in respect of the reason for the incident, the anticipated extent of delays and actions being taken to resolve the situation.

xii) Particularly vulnerable passengers

As soon as practicable after it becomes known that the train is likely to be stranded, efforts should be made to identify any particularly vulnerable passengers. It may be helpful to engage the help of fellow passengers in this task, for example by making an announcement such as the following: 'Ladies and gentlemen, as you are aware we have already been subject to a considerable delay. I'd like to ask for your help in identifying anyone on the train who requires particular assistance, for example because they don't have a good understanding of English or because they have a disability or a particular medical condition. So could you please check whether this applies to anyone near you and help them if you can or let me know when I walk through the train in a few minutes time. Thank you'.

It should be recognised that this may be quite a challenging and/or time consuming process for members of traincrew, particularly if passage through the length of the train is restricted due to it being full and standing or in the absence of inter-unit gangway connections. As an alternative, consideration should be given to identifying a responsible passenger who may be able to walk through the train for the purpose of identifying particularly vulnerable passengers and their specific needs.

When such persons have been identified arrangements should be made to meet their specific needs to the extent to which this is practical. For those who are simply hard of hearing this may be as simple asking fellow passengers to repeat announcements to them or writing down information as necessary. For those whose first language is not English it may be asking by means of the PA whether any speakers of the language concerned are on the train, while for those with particular medical needs it may mean arranging for suitable emergency supplies to be delivered to the train. The option to invite them to move to an area nearer to a member of railway staff (or vice versa) so that a closer eye can be kept on them should also be considered.

The following are further considerations which may need to be addressed:

a) Wheelchair users: Access to on-board toilet facilities - it may be necessary to ensure a through route to accessible toilets if the train is overcrowded.

b) Passengers with assistance animals e.g. Guide Dogs - it may be necessary to supply a bowl of water for an assistance dog, particularly in warmer weather.

c) Passengers who are diabetic and insulin dependent - it may be necessary to give access to appropriate food.

d) Passengers with cognitive impairments - try to make instructions as simple and as clear as possible. Do not use over technical language or jargon.

xiii) Wi-Fi

Where trains are Wi-Fi enabled, railway undertakings should endeavour to remove any requirement for stranded passengers to have to pay to use the functionality. At the same time, any bandwith restrictions that may be in place should be lifted so that stranded passengers can continue to access information from websites and social media channels.

xiv) GSM-R

The PIDD-39 requirement states ‘So that TOCs can make manual announcements to customers on trains, including DOO operated services, the work previously done to ensure the GSM-R modifications are made,

which will allow TOC controllers to make remote announcements to the train, will be delivered subject to costs'. See also Part 10.1.3.

8.4 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – heating/air conditioning

8.4.1 Extremes of external temperatures – either very hot or very cold conditions – are liable to exacerbate the situation in the event of trains becoming stranded and it is not possible to provide or maintain on-train heating or air conditioning. Railway undertakings should have in place specific 'hot weather' and 'cold weather' plans to anticipate and mitigate such situations, e.g. through carrying additional supplies of drinks or special emergency packs on trains.

8.4.2 In the event of a train becoming stranded an assessment of the environmental conditions in each vehicle should be undertaken and the results reported to Control. Suggested timescales/frequencies for this are as follows:

External temperature	**Status of on-train heating/AC**	**Initial assessment**	**Periodic assessments**
Moderate (i.e. 5°C – 25°C)	Functioning	After 30 minutes	Every 60 minutes
	Not functioning	After 30 minutes	Every 30 minutes
Cold (i.e. below 5°C)	Functioning	After 30 minutes	Every 30 minutes
	Not functioning	After 20 minutes	Every 20 minutes
Hot (i.e. above 25°C)	Functioning	After 20 minutes	Every 20 minutes
	Not functioning	After 15 minutes	Every 15 minutes

8.4.3 It is recommended that as part of their training, traincrew should be alerted to how quickly conditions in an air conditioned coach can deteriorate to a potentially dangerous extent on a hot day (or in conditions of bright sunlight) in the event of the failure of the air conditioning. The build-up of humidity on a heavily-loaded train can be especially problematic. RDG Guidance Note RDG-GN015 Extreme Weather Arrangements, including Failure or Non-Availability of On-Train Environment Control Systems includes detailed discussion and guidance on the issues associated with hot weather in the context of stranded trains and of the failure/non-availability of on-train air conditioning more generally and attention is drawn to this.

8.4.4 Railway undertakings may wish to provide emergency supplies of 'space blankets' on board trains during periods when extremely cold weather is forecast, particular those operating over exposed/remote routes. In the event that train heating is unavailable during cold conditions, traincrew should seek to concentrate passengers together to generate/conserve heat.

8.4.5 In cases where the loss of on-train heating and other systems is due to icing of conductor rails preventing trains from drawing power, consideration should be given to local treatment of the 3rd rail adjacent to the pick-up shoes with the objective not of allowing the train to move but only of restoring power for such on-train systems. Portable de-icing spraying equipment is available for this.

8.5 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers - light

8.5.1 Traincrew should be provided with instructions on how to maintain minimum levels of lighting on board a train which becomes stranded without power either during the hours of darkness or in a tunnel. This might include concentrating passengers in certain vehicles and turning lighting off in other vehicles to conserve battery power, or turning off a proportion of lights where this is provided for. Passengers should similarly be concentrated in the event that lighting fails completely as this will serve to reduce security risks/concerns and generally provide re-assurance.

8.6 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – particularly vulnerable people

8.6.1 As described in Part 8.3.2 xii) above, the specific needs of particularly vulnerable people should be identified and addressed to the extent possible.

8.7 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – access to toilets

8.7.1 Railway undertakings should ensure that traincrew are made aware of the characteristics of toilet systems provided in the rolling stock they operate. Though conditions in them may deteriorate to below what is desirable as water available for flushing is exhausted, conventional (i.e. non-retention) toilets of the kind installed in much older rolling stock can generally continue to be used reasonably indefinitely. This is not the case with more modern systems, as once either the toilet water tank is empty, or the controlled emission tank is full, flushing is no longer possible. The design does not allow for the content of the toilet bowl to empty partially due to gravity as is the case for a traditional toilet, thus it simply fills up. This effectively means that once flushing has ceased the toilets will no longer be usable.

8.7.2 In both cases (but particularly the latter) traincrew should seek as far as possible to manage use of toilets to conserve water (through reducing flushing and encouraging passengers to use as little water as possible for hand washing). Announcements to this effect should be considered, though it should be recognised that this might have the opposite effect to that intended if passengers panic that toilet facilities are about to be lost.

8.7.3 An additional problem with modern toilets is that many rely on electricity to flush. In the event of a loss of on-train power they will work off the train battery for a limited time but will be subject to load shedding (i.e. battery protection) fairly early on, so that residual power is reserved for cab radios, saloon ventilation fans, emergency lights, door controls, traction and brake controls, etc. Typically, new batteries will last for about 90-120 minutes from when power fails, though this drops off as the batteries get older. Toilets and other load shed equipment, such as air conditioning, heating and main lighting, will lose power much sooner than this.

8.7.4 Railway undertakings should ascertain the particular characteristics of the toilets on the trains which they operate (type of toilet, whether reliant on electrical power, etc.) and make this information available to members of traincrew.

8.7.5 Railway undertakings should have in place contingency arrangements for when passengers are stranded on trains with no access to a functioning toilet.

8.8 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – food and drink

8.8.1 In hot conditions, regular intake of liquids is essential for health reasons. More generally, access to drinks will gain in importance as the delay extends, particularly for young children and those with certain medical conditions. Access to food is less essential from a strictly health perspective but may contribute to providing re-assurance and comfort to stranded passengers. Railway undertakings should consider the following means of making food and drink available to passengers on board stranded trains:

i) By using existing supplies from the buffet car or catering trolley.

ii) By providing emergency supplies on board trains and/or at nominated stations, either permanently or when extreme weather/temperatures is/are forecast.

iii) By encouraging passengers to share any food/drink they have brought onto the train themselves.

iv) By getting supplies to the train (either by means of another train, by road, or by helicopter) - to facilitate this, railway undertakings should consider maintaining stockpiles of emergency supplies at nominated stations, either permanently or when extreme weather/temperatures is/are forecast.

v) By arranging for refreshments to be provided to passengers once evacuated from the stranded train.

8.9 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – post evacuation

8.9.1 In the event that passengers are evacuated, whether to another train, a station or some form of reception centre, the railway undertaking should as far as is practicable ensure that the following are immediately available to them:

i) Information as to the arrangements for them to continue their journey (or be otherwise accommodated).

ii) Toilet facilities.

iii) Refreshments.

iv) Medical facilities.

v) Assistance in contacting concerned friends/relatives.

vi) Information on compensation to which they may be entitled and how this may be claimed.

8.10 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – post-event

8.10.1 Railway undertakings should have arrangements in place to make passengers aware of entitlements to refunds, compensation, etc. Acting proactively, for example by giving out forms, is likely to be received positively by passengers; conversely not doing so will serve to compound passengers' ill feelings towards them.

8.10.2 If the stranding incident leads to a formal investigation, it may help to restore passengers' confidence and regain their goodwill if this is published (e.g. on the company's website) and this action is publicised (e.g. through posters at stations), so that it can be shown that any necessary lessons have been identified and learned.

8.11 Anticipating and meeting the needs of stranded passengers – journey's end

8.11.1 It should be remembered that from the perspective of the passenger, the need that triggered their use of the railway in the first place was that of getting to a particular destination and that their expectation on starting their journey was that they would do so. Being involved in a stranded train incident does not alter this (though the intended destination may change as a result - for example, they may prefer to return to their starting point if the extent of the delay invalidates their purpose for travelling). Railway undertakings and Network Rail should ensure that their response plans recognise this. Accordingly, they should provide for the various needs of stranded passengers, as described above, to continue to be met not just until such time as the immediate problem is resolved (i.e. the affected train is able to continue its journey or the passengers are evacuated from it) but until passengers have reached their final destinations.

Part 9 Command and control

9.1 Overview

9.1.1 To ensure any incident is managed effectively, a command and control structure should be established. Existing standards for the management of incidents follow a national template and this Part sets out how this should apply to stranded trains.

9.1.2 The application of the command and control procedure will depend upon how the route is organised and local procedures will be required. The following sets out a framework which is summarised in Appendix C in the form of suggested timelines for making and implementing decisions and is recommended as the briefing document for the personnel involved. Individual roles are described in more detail in Part 10.

9.1.3 As for the management of any operational incident, any controlled evacuation of a passenger train should be a co-operative venture between Network Rail and the railway undertaking;

9.1.4 Different means of controlled evacuation will require differing levels of command and control and attendance

9.1.5 Before controlled evacuation takes place, the Control should consider the nine options shown in Part 11.2.

9.1.6 In addition to and to supplement pre-planned arrangements, those charged with managing the situation should be encouraged to be imaginative in exploring options for solutions and mitigations. For example, it might be possible to use a permanent way trolley to transfer supplies to a stranded train and/or to transport less able-bodied passengers in the event of a controlled evacuation.

9.1.7 Command and control decisions should take into account the views and advice of the emergency services if these are on-site.

Part 10 Key roles, responsibilities and support needs

Note: While this Part assigns specific responsibilities to specific job titles, it is recognised that these – and the allocation of such responsibilities to them, will vary between organisations. The key message is that the arrangements each organisation has in place should recognise and address the various aspects described.

10.1 Signaller

10.1.1 *Immediate action* **-** On first becoming or being made aware that a train has become or is likely to become stranded, the signaller will alert the Network Rail Route Control and take appropriate immediate action to prevent other trains from becoming trapped, for example by implementing line or route diversions or arranging for trains to be held at stations.

10.1.2 *Ongoing action* - In many cases the signaller will, at least initially, continue to be the primary contact for the driver of the stranded train and hence both the source of information concerning the incident and a conduit of communication between the driver and railway undertaking concerned. The signaller needs to remain alert throughout to reports from the driver concerning conditions for passengers on board the train, including their behaviour, and if these are not forthcoming they should prompt the driver for them on a regular basis, particularly in conditions of extreme temperatures.

10.1.3 *Announcement to passengers* – Subject to them having a suitable Fixed Terminal and also the train being suitably equipped, the GSM-R system provides for railway undertaking and Network Rail Control Office staff (as well as signallers) to speak directly to passengers on DOO trains by means of the train's PA system.

10.2 Traincrew

10.2.1 *Introduction* - Members of traincrew will come under great pressure in the event of their train becoming stranded. In addition to any operational requirements – for example drivers will need to maintain regular contact with signallers and may also be required to engage in fault finding/fixing - until such time as additional resources can be mobilised and deployed to the train they will be the primary source of information and support to passengers on board the train. They will continue to be the principal source until the train is able to continue its journey or passengers are evacuated. Specifically:

i) They will be the source of much of the information needed by those determining the overall response (by reporting the conditions on the train).

ii) They will be the means by which the needs of passengers stranded on the train are met (or not).

iii) They will be the primary means of providing information to passengers whilst on the train.

iv) They will be the focus of passenger frustration.

10.2.2 It should also be remembered that at a personal level they may also share many of the concerns of passengers in terms of how the delay will impact on their non-work commitments. Additionally, they may well have already been on duty for a considerable number of hours before their train became stranded.

10.2.3 *Anticipating and meeting the needs of traincrew* - In managing the expectations and meeting the needs of passengers stranded on trains, the principal needs of traincrew are:

i) Information, both for their own benefit and for passing on to passengers. Information, including the 'Core Message' as defined under PIDD, should be provided proactively but there should also be a means for traincrew to request additional information. To achieve this a "single point of contact" should be identified and established so that traincrew who are onboard stranded trains can have a robust communications link with the relevant Control office. This single point of contact could be a traincrew manager or inspector made available specifically to provide help and support. Use of social networking sites to supply information to staff as well as passengers should also be considered (see Part 8.3.2 vi).

ii) There is clear evidence that the making of frequent announcements, even where there is no new information, serves to reassure passengers that they are not being ignored and thereby lessens the likelihood that they will embark on self-evacuation.

iii) Support in the form of additional persons who can be tasked with helping to manage the situation (e.g. provide reassurance, supervise the emergency opening of external doors to provide ventilation, assist with evacuation, etc.). In addition to deploying a TOLO and RIO, railway undertakings and Network Rail should work together to deploy additional staff to each stranded train to report to and assist the traincrew. This may include management staff (on-call or otherwise) and station based staff.

10.2.4 *Assistance on-board the train* – In attempting to manage the expectations and meet the needs of passengers stranded on trains, traincrew should seek the assistance of others. Such persons include:

i) Members of on-board staff (noting that this includes railway staff irrespective of their employer or role - see definition in Part 4).

ii) Members of the British Transport Police.

iii) Members of other police forces.

iv) Members of the fire service.

v) Doctors and other suitable, medically trained persons.

vi) Other persons who have the 'personal authority' and confidence to direct and lead others and are fit to do so.

10.2.5 In connection with the first of the above, Network Rail and railway undertakings should encourage all of their staff to offer assistance to traincrew in such circumstances.

10.2.6 In all cases the traincrew should reach a clear understanding with the person assisting a) that they will at all times act only under the direction of the traincrew (or other person as nominated by the traincrew) and b) concerning exactly what is required of them.

10.3 Incident Controller

10.3.1 This is the person appointed to be responsible for co-ordinating the overall response, including key decision making as described in Part 7. This will normally be a Network Rail appointment but it is the joint responsibility of Network Rail and the railway undertaking(s) involved to ensure that the person so appointed is provided with the information necessary to make informed decisions which take due consideration of the needs of stranded passengers.

10.3.2 The Incident Controller should ensure that in addition to recording how operational issues have been resolved, Control Log entries concerning the incident also detail how passengers on board have been dealt with (including timelines).

10.4 Mobile Operations Manager/RIO

10.4.1 The Mobile Operations Manager should make their way to the site and commence duties as a RIO if required. As per prescribed incident management procedures, they should start to acquire and maintain a detailed overview of the situation, from both an operational and passenger focused perspective, and provide this information to the Incident Controller. To this end, they should maintain close liaison with the signaller, the traincrew of all affected trains and the TOLO(s) as well as any (other) MOMs who may have been appointed in the case of multiple trains having become stranded. They should also work with the TOLO, signaller and traincrew to prepare for and initiate evacuation of passengers from the train should this be necessary.

10.5 TOLO

10.5.1 The TOLO should make their way to the site, report to the RIO in the first instance and subsequently make themselves known to the traincrew. A primary TOLO responsibility is to ensure that conditions on board the train are regularly monitored and reported back to the RIO. In particular, the TOLO should determine whether the situation on board the train is such that an evacuation is required and make such a recommendation to the RIO.

10.6 Network Rail Route Control Manager (RCM)

10.6.1 This is the person with overall command of the control staff dealing with the incident and responsibility for ensuring adherence with protocols. Also, they may assume the Strategic (Gold) Command role when/if a command structure is put in place for the incident.

10.7 On call customer service manager

10.7.1 If a decision is taken to evacuate passengers from a stranded train the On Call Customer Service Manager should arrange for staff, along with supplies of food and drink, to be made available at the location(s) to which the evacuated passengers are to be taken. If it is not a station, this should be done in conjunction with the Local Authority or other third party as appropriate. The On Call Customer Services Manager should also ensure that suitable messages are being communicated by the NRCC and social media, etc.

10.8 Information Controller

10.8.1 A person (or persons) should be appointed as Lead Information Controller to provide information to and receive information from those at the site (including traincrew) and those in Control. This will include issuing the CSL2 message and Core Messages as defined under PIDD. In addition, the Information Controller should ensure that the NRCC is made aware of the situation and updated on a frequent and regular basis.

10.9 Stranded Passenger Champion

10.9.1 It is recommended that a senior railway undertaking manager be appointed specifically as a Stranded Passenger Champion for the duration of the incident. Their responsibility should be to ensure both that the emerging needs of stranded passengers are responded to and that they are a key input to the decision making process. Their authority in this role should be recognised by all concerned, including the Incident Controller.

10.10 Logging of decisions

10.10.1 With stranded passenger incidents liable to trigger extensive investigations, potentially including legal inquiries, all those in decision making roles should ensure that a record is kept of all significant decisions made, as well as the basis for the decision (including the information known at the time and any risk assessments undertaken) and the basis on which alternative options were rejected. Where meetings are convened (including by phone/video conferencing), it is recommended that a suitable trained decision loggist be made available to make such records.

Part 11 Evacuation

11.1 Introduction

11.1.1 Evacuation of passengers from a stranded train (unless alongside a platform), particularly if to or via the track, is likely to present a number of significant risks which will need to be managed and is therefore not likely to be an immediately preferred option. However, as noted in Part 7.1.4, there is a limit on how long passengers will be prepared to remain on a stranded train, even though this may be the safest environment for them, and when it is judged to be likely that passengers will start to self-evacuate (based on feedback and advice from traincrew and other staff on site), a controlled evacuation of the train(s) should be started as soon as possible, with passengers informed of this intention.

11.1.2 While the conditions for a controlled evacuation may be less than ideal, self-evacuation by passengers will generally be a worse outcome and controlled evacuation should always be considered as a means of preventing this (subject to ensuring that key conditions such as ensuring that all train movements on adjacent tracks have been stopped and that the traction current on 3rd rail equipped routes has been switched off, have been met).

11.1.3 If it is decided that a controlled evacuation is to be commenced, the person charged with leading the evacuation must ensure they have identified any people on board the train who are unable to evacuate (both unassisted or assisted) from the train's current location with the resources and equipment available. Every effort to support such people should be made, including information detailing how they will be transported, timescales, means of communications and facilities available to them. If available, a member of staff should stay with or be available for anyone left behind following the initial evacuation. In particular, vulnerable passengers should not be left alone. The assistance of the emergency services may be required to evacuate passengers where this is beyond the abilities of the rail industry personnel available. Emergency services should be informed of the possible request for their assistance in the evacuation as soon as possible.

11.1.4 While many other factors will need to be considered, as a starting point - and in situations where conditions on board a stranded train (air quality, temperature, access to toilets, etc) remain good - the aspiration should be to commence evacuation of passengers within one hour of the train initially coming to a stand and to complete the process within a further hour.

11.2 Options for evacuation

11.2.1 The following means of evacuation are presented in the general order of preference:

i) From train to platform, achievable by:

   a) Holding trains alongside a platform.

   b) Moving trains (either forwards or backwards) so as to have at least one door accessible by passengers alongside a platform.

   c) Moving trains (either forwards or backwards) into an occupied platform under emergency permissive arrangements (where this is permitted by the Rule Book).

   d) Buffering up with a train in front or in rear to allow passengers to walk through until they are able to alight onto an adjacent platform.

ii) To another train, achievable by:

   a) The second train buffering up to the front or rear of the stranded train and passengers walking through by means of end corridor connections.

   b) The second train being brought up in front or rear of the stranded train and passengers transferring between the two trains via the track (i.e. where one of other of the trains has no end corridor connection or where corridor connections are not compatible).

   c) The second train being brought alongside the stranded train and passengers then transferring between them using approved ramps or “bridges”.

   d) The second train being brought alongside the stranded train and passengers transferring between them via the track.

iii) Escorting passengers from train to track and then via the trackside to a station or access/egress point(s).

Clearly the circumstances will dictate which of the above options is available.

11.2.2 In all cases of evacuation, but particularly when passengers have been evacuated to or via the track, care must be taken to ensure that all those evacuated have been accounted for (i.e. have not become lost or unknowingly left behind in the process).

11.2.3 Railway undertakings should also consider what advice/instructions to provide to passengers and staff concerning luggage in the event of an evacuation. On one hand taking luggage will slow down the evacuation and potentially give rise to additional risks, particularly if it has to be carried or wheeled for any distance. On the other, many passengers will not be prepared to leave luggage on the train as it is unchecked, may contain essential or valuable items, will probably be unlabelled, and they may well be unable to recover it for some time. Attempts to persuade or compel them to do so may give rise to altercations with staff. Arrangements for safe storage of any items of luggage or other personal effects left on the train or otherwise separated from their owners, and for returning or reclaiming these, should be put in place.

Part 12 Driver Only Operation

12.1 Driver Only Operated (DOO) services

12.1.1 The stranding of a Driver Only Operated train, especially in the absence of any other members of on-board staff, presents particular challenges. The requirement to manage the expectations of passengers and meet their needs remains identical to that for non-DOO trains but the ability to do so is very much reduced, not least as the driver has specific safety related duties prescribed by the Rule Book which must take precedence over providing passenger information.

12.1.2 In the event of a DOO passenger train becoming stranded the first priority should therefore be to deploy a competent member of either Network Rail or railway undertaking staff to the train to provide support for the driver and assume responsibility for responding to the needs of passengers.

12.1.3 In parallel, arrangements should be put in place to communicate with passengers on board the train without this being entirely reliant on the driver- see Part 10.1.3.

12.1.4 Where drivers on DOO trains are required to leave the train (for example to examine the train or lay protection), they should first communicate this to passengers, so they understand why there may be a period of silence and that they are not being ignored.

Part 13 External agencies

13.1 Assistance agencies

13.1.1 Agencies external to the rail industry are potentially able to offer assistance with the evacuation of stranded passengers and/or providing them with food, drink, clothing or general rest and reception facilities. In particular, local authorities have a statutory duty (as Category One Responders under the Civil Contingencies Act) to respond to an emergency, including looking after people affected.

13.1.2 While the basic premise is that the rail industry (and in particular the railway undertaking) will retain responsibility for ensuring that passengers are able to complete their journeys, or are put up in accommodation where this is not immediately possible, there are two exceptions to this:

i) Where, though the cause of the disruption is specific to the rail industry (train failures, power problems, track problems, etc.), the numbers involved are such as to be liable to overwhelm the industry's ability to respond effectively, in which case requesting the help of the local authority may be the best means of meeting passenger needs.

ii) Where the cause of the disruption, and the impact, is not specific to the railway but more generic in nature – most obviously weather related. In this case the principle should be that:

a) Railway undertakings (in conjunction, where appropriate, with Network Rail and the British Transport Police) will retain responsibility for any passengers on board trains or at the trackside.

b) Once passengers have been evacuated from the train onto a public highway, the expectation is that the local authority will be better placed to take the lead in providing emergency rest and refreshment facilities for them.

c) While railway undertakings should endeavour to retain responsibility for passengers stranded at stations, where the circumstances mean that the train operator is rendered powerless to make alternative transport arrangements then again requesting the assistance of the local authority may be appropriate.

13.1.3 It should not be assumed that all local authorities are necessarily supportive of (or even familiar with) these principles and Network Rail Routes and railway undertakings should therefore seek to reach agreement with them.

13.1.4 In addition to local authorities, the following may be able to provide assistance:

i) Fire & Rescue service – provision of manpower and equipment (including ladders) to assist with train to track evacuation. Fire & Rescue service assistance should be requested as a matter of course if passengers who are likely to find it difficult to detrain – such as those in wheelchairs – are on board.

ii) British Transport Police – manpower to supplement rail industry staff in providing reassurance and also help with crowd control.

iii) RVS (Royal Voluntary Service – formerly WRVS) – provision of emergency supplies and reassurance to stranded passengers.

iv) 4 x 4 Response UK – able to provide 4 wheel drive vehicles.

v) British Red Cross – in addition to providing human resources, the BRC also has a fleet of specialist 4 x 4 vehicles.

13.1.5 It is recommended that Network Rail Routes and railway undertakings maintain up to date lists of emergency contacts for each of the above organisations (along with any others active locally in the areas served that are potentially able to assist) as well as a regular dialogue with them.

Appendix A – Possible causes of stranded trains

There are a variety of reasons why a train may be brought to stand or prevented from making further movement and thus become 'stranded' (as defined in this Guidance Note). The following table lists possible causes of trains becoming stranded together with whether the driver or signaller will be the more knowledgeable about the circumstances. In all cases the person(s) concerned should comply with the applicable rules and regulations:

Cause of stranding	*Lead**
Failure of the train	D
Failure of the signalling system	S
Failure of the traction current supply[4]	D
Failure/non-availability of the infrastructure (track faults, subsidence, flooding, etc.)	D/S
Presence of trespassers, animals and other obstructions	D/S
Police request (e.g. fatality, police chasing suspects, terrorist threat or incident)	S
Line ahead blocked by other trains	S
Driver taken ill or otherwise incapacitated	D[5]
Major incident (e.g. train involved in derailment or collision or one in the vicinity)	D/S
Incidents outside but affecting railway property (smoke, fires, chemical spillages, exclusion zones, etc.)	D/S
Signaller(s) taken ill or otherwise incapacitated (e.g. signalbox evacuated)	Route Control
Unauthorised persons (including passengers) on or about the line – note that this may be both a cause and a consequence of a train becoming stranded	D/S

* i.e. who is first likely to become aware of and/or have most information concerning the situation. D = Driver, S = Signaller, D/S = could be either (depending on whether the problem is already known about or is being first discovered and/or other circumstances)

[4] Electrically powered trains only. Diesel powered trains running out of fuel are covered by 'Failure of train'

[5] Or another member of the traincrew or on-board staff

Appendix B – Passengers stranded on trains structured risk assessment – factors to take into account to determine the scale of incident

Risk Factor		
Reason		
Duration		
Time of day/day of week		
No. of trains involved		
Location		
Distance to nearest station		
No. of passengers		
Types of passenger		
Standing passengers		
Special needs/ vulnerable passengers		
No./type of staff		
Whether DOO		
Ease with which staff can walk through train		
Geography		
Weather		
External light		
External ground conditions		
Nearest road access (if evacuation is to track side)		
Presence of OHLE/third tail		
Other trains in area (if these might cause congestion that would impact on time to effect evacuation)		
Internal conditions. Default assumption should be 'poor' unless there is clear evidence to the contrary		
Availability/functioning of toilets		
Availability of on-train PA		

On-train emergency equipment and access to it		
Availability of suitable assisting loco/train		
Provision of rescue trains		
Availability of alternative road transport		

The above list is intended to be indicative rather than exhaustive

Appendix C – Suggested timelines from when it is established that a train is stranded

Within	Signaller	Driver (Guard)	Incident Controller	Mobile Operations Manager/ RIO	On Call Operations Manager/ TOLO	On Call Customer Service Manager	Information Controller	Stranded Passenger Champion
10 Minutes	Identify stranded train/s and advise Control of trains trapped. Attempt to get stranded train into platform. Hold other trains alongside platforms; avoid putting trains into affected area.	Contact Signaller.	Call out MOM. Write prioritised plan. Appoint RIO. Call out TOLO.	Start to make way to trapped train. Become RIO.	Start to make way to nearest station or access point.	Check supplies of water/food.	Issue holding message. Ensure NRCC is updated.	Ensure that needs of stranded passengers are being met and taken fully into account in overall response management.

Within	**Signaller**	**Driver (Guard)**	**Incident Controller**	**Mobile Operations Manager/ RIO**	**On Call Operations Manager/ TOLO**	**On Call Customer Service Manager**	**Information Controller**	**Stranded Passenger Champion**
20 Minutes	Work through above options with RIO, maintain contact with the Driver.	Once aware that train is stranded focus on continuing reassurance/ care of passengers.	Lead prioritised plan.	Liaise with Signaller/ Incident Controller/ Traincrew. Work with TOLO.	Start to make way to stranded train to support RIO and become TOLO.	Ensure staff available with supplies at potential point where customers will detrain. Monitor messages put out by NRCC and via social media.	Communicat e with guard/s on stranded train/s. Ensure NRCC is updated.	Ensure that needs of stranded passengers are being met and taken fully into account in overall response management.
30 Minutes	Continue as above.	Work with Signaller/ RIO on options.	Support Network Rail Route Control Manager by taking responsibility for options.	Work through options with signaller.	Support RIO with options, particularly with regard to passenger care on the train.	Be prepared to greet customers and arrange alternative transport. Monitor messages put out by NRCC and via social media.	Issue CSL2 message. Ensure NRCC is updated.	Ensure that needs of stranded passengers are being met and taken fully into account in overall response management.
Target 1 hour	**Commence evacuation/assistance**							

Within	**Signaller**	**Driver (Guard)**	**Incident Controller**	**Mobile Operations Manager/ RIO**	**On Call Operations Manager/ TOLO**	**On Call Customer Service Manager**	**Information Controller**	**Stranded Passenger Champion**
Target 2 hours	**Complete evacuation/assistance (depending on location and numbers involved)**							
Note: The above timescales are indicative only and will be subject to risk assessment of conditions on the day								

Appendix D – Guidance for railway undertaking staff on actions to take in respect of passengers stranded on trains

This Appendix suggests actions for railway undertaking Traincrew, Operations Control staff and Customer Response Teams in the event of passengers becoming stranded on trains.

Such actions are broken down into time bands (generally 'first 30 minutes', '30 to 60 minutes' and 'after 60 minutes'). However, **it should be noted that these time bands are suggestions only and should be regarded as flexible, taking into account the various factors set out in Part 7.3.** In particular, railway undertakings may wish to adopt greater urgency when circumstances demand, e.g. during periods of excessively hot weather.

In addition, it is recognised that a number of the suggested actions will be dependent both on the availability of staff and what physical equipment is carried on the train and that certain of them will not be practical where trains are DOO.

D1 Checklists for train crew

D1.1 Within first 30 minutes

When your train has become stranded, within the first 30 minutes:

- *Assess the situation*

  You must make an assessment of any train failure and advise Control if the failure is likely to result in technical assistance being required and you judge that the delay is likely to exceed 30 minutes. If, additionally, on-train air conditioning systems have failed, then a plan must be prepared on possible controlled passenger evacuation options. The decision to prepare for evacuation must be communicated to Control once the factors outlined below have been considered:

  - *Is there any positive confirmation from the Control that assistance can be provided within the hour?*
  - *Is it likely that interior conditions will deteriorate due to the external temperatures?*
  - *Are toilets available?*
  - *What are the conditions outside the train and are these likely to change (e.g. temperature, weather, lighting)?*
  - *Is there a safe place to which passengers could be evacuated? Is there a safe route to get to that location?*

Whilst the controlled evacuation may not actually commence for up to 60 minutes, pre planning will give you both time to summon suitable help and the 'thinking time' to prepare a safe method of evacuation.

- *Information*

  You must identify the location of the failed train to the Control and try to ascertain the most practical means of accessing the train for the purpose of providing supplies or assisting with any controlled evacuation. *Information to passengers*

  Provided all necessary 'on-board' functions such as toilets and air conditioning are operating correctly, you should monitor the situation and give information to passengers on progress of rescue arrangements. On-board conditions are unlikely to deteriorate within the first 30 minutes. If they do, refer to D1.2 (Between 30 to 60 minutes) for additional actions to take.

- *Availability of other staff and other potentially supporting persons on the train*

  You should request all on-board staff, other rail staff and other persons (such as emergency services personnel and those with medical training) travelling on the train to make themselves available to assist should the situation escalate, requiring further action.

- *Window blinds*

  During hot weather or in the event of failure of on train air conditioning, lower window blinds and/or draw curtains (where provided) to prevent direct sunlight entering the vehicle.

- *Exterior doors*

  During hot weather, release an appropriate number of exterior doors to aid flow of fresh air to the train. The doors are to be released in agreement with the Driver, and then only when the Signaller's permission has been obtained and there is no likelihood of imminent rescue.

  Cess side doors to be released wherever possible. Only release doors adjacent to a running line when the Signaller has confirmed all train movements on that line(s) have been stopped.

  Exterior doors are only to be released when a competent attendant (who could be a member of the public) can be positioned at the door to prevent people from falling, crowding to the edge or self-evacuating. To reduce such risks, it may be appropriate to open the doors only part way.

As many doors on one side of the train as needed may be released subject to the above. Other than on single lines doors must not be released on both sides of the train simultaneously unless conditions are exceptional and there is a serious health risk to people on board the stranded train, and the Signaller's permission has been obtained.

Maintaining internal gangway doors in the open position may help a little with the flow of any air, and even if not, can sometimes have a positive psychological effect on stressed passengers.

Communication must be maintained with other train crew members, Control and the Signaller to ensure that doors facing adjacent lines can be closed to allow moving trains, such as a rescue loco, to pass safely.

D1.2 Between 30 and 60 minutes

When your train has been stranded between 30 and 60 minutes you must:

- *Assess the situation*

  Undertake a further assessment of the situation and of conditions on the train. Where the delay to the service is likely to exceed 60 minutes, you should note the existence and specific needs of any vulnerable people who may need special attention. On-board functions such as toilets and air circulation will be likely to be affected by this time, and you need to consider the following actions dependant on the severity of the on-board conditions:

  - *Refreshments*

    Issue free refreshments, giving priority to vulnerable groups such as small children, the elderly, and those with medical problems aggravated by the conditions.

  - *Movement of passengers within the train*

    Spread passengers through the train where practicable to prevent localised crowding increasing the likelihood of adverse conditions. Declassifying First Class accommodation may help to achieve this.

  - *Kitchen/buffet areas*

    Pay special attention to kitchen and buffet areas and take these out of use when conditions become unsafe. You should make an assessment of the desirability and practicality of continuing to serve food and consider whether catering staff might be better utilised elsewhere in the train.

- *Progress reports*

  You should always attempt to keep passengers informed about the progress being made to rescue the train, maintaining a close liaison with Control to do this.

D1.3 Controlled evacuation of train (at the latest after 60 minutes)

Controlled evacuation of a train onto, or adjacent to, a running line carries a degree of risk to passengers and employees. This risk has to be balanced against the risk of them remaining on the train during an 'emergency' situation.

The decision to evacuate a train under these circumstances requires you to be aware of the potential risks and make a decision based on them.

- *Consideration of risk*

  Where the risk is less immediate, and not perceived as life threatening, there may be a reluctance to evacuate the train, as this may be considered to be 'over reacting' to the situation. The decision to keep passengers on board may further be influenced by the risk of losing control of a large group of people in a trackside environment. In taking the decision to evacuate the train, you need to be aware of the potential effects of poor air quality and internal conditions on the welfare and health of passengers and weigh this against the risks and consequences of moving people to track level.

- *Criteria for controlled evacuation of train*

  Once it has been agreed to evacuate, a controlled evacuation should commence as soon as possible, **but only where the following circumstances apply:**

  1. *There is no likelihood of restoration of on-train critical functions (circulation of fresh air) within the next hour.*

     AND

  2. *Release of external doors has not sufficiently improved on-board conditions.*

     AND

  3. *The site assessment (as described below) indicates it is safe for passengers to leave the train.*

- *Deciding to evacuate*

  Any decision you take to carry out a controlled evacuation should be with the agreement of Control. As part of any discussions with Control about the need for such an evacuation, you should advise them of any degradation of the environmental

conditions on the train and the impact on passenger health and safety. You should also comply with the requirements set out within Section 6.3 of Module M1 of the Rule Book, which include protection of relevant running lines.

- *Site assessment*

  When deciding whether to carry out any controlled evacuation of the train, the following factors must be considered to assist you in reaching a decision that is appropriate for the circumstances.

  A site assessment must be conducted between the Driver and the Guard/Train Manager. This assessment must identify the following:

  - *Location of any damaged OLE and the risk of accidental contact*

    Whilst damaged OLE is unlikely to be charged to maximum voltage, a significant residual current may well remain. YOU MUST ASSUME THE OLE IS LIVE AT ALL TIMES.

  - *Evacuation should always be carried out in such a way as to avoid passing any damaged OLE*

    The location of any damaged OLE must be confirmed prior to evacuation and the door(s) to be used for evacuation selected accordingly. It should be remembered that the nearest/most appropriate point of safety to which to evacuate passengers may be either ahead of or to the rear of the train.

  - *Is the condition of the pantograph a potential hazard to alighting evacuees?*

    Loose or disconnected parts of OLE present a serious electrocution hazard.

  - *The presence of a 3rd rail electrification system*

    If such exists, evacuation should not commence until confirmation has been received that the traction current has been switched off. It should be noted that tracks may be equipped with both 3rd rail and OLE.

  - *Is there a suitable place away from the operational railway to which evacuees can be directed?*

    The presence of a Network Rail 'Mobile Operations Manager' (referred to as a MOM) will assist in agreeing a safe refuge/egress from the operational railway.

  - *If not, is it safe for evacuees to remain in the cess?*

    In addition to railway specific risks, external temperatures and weather conditions should be taken into account, remembering that in addition to

obviously unfavourable conditions such as falling rain/snow and high winds, evacuees should not be required to remain in direct sunlight and air temperatures below freezing are likely to mean slippery conditions underfoot.

- *Have you a confirmation from Network Rail that movements in the area have been stopped?*

  Again, the presence of the MOM and/or TOLO, will ensure a greater degree of safety from train movements and track conditions during evacuation.

- *Are there sufficient traincrew (including responsible travelling rail staff) or staff from the emergency services available to manage the number of evacuees?*

  If the emergency services are on site then they will normally make the decision to evacuate.

- *Other hazards*

  A site assessment should also consider the underfoot conditions, proximity of embankments, tunnels, and other infrastructure hazards, along with the presence of a suitable safe route from the train to the most practicable egress point and how staff will be deployed to assist.

- *Protection of staff and passengers from view of incident sites*

  Evacuation routes should avoid both passengers being evacuated and staff having to walk past scenes which they may find distressing, for example where a fatality has occurred

- *Assistance from rail staff and other suitable individuals*

  Assistance should be sought as necessary from all on-board staff and any other staff travelling on the train. Assistance may be summoned from any rail industry staff who offer their services. Assistance may also be available from other persons (such as emergency services personnel and those with medical training).

- *Support*

  If there are insufficient staff available to carry out safe controlled evacuation, Control should be notified and assistance requested. A judgement has to be made on the ability of available staff to safely lead customers to a position of safety prior to evacuating the train. Once controlled evacuation has been identified as a possible/likely option, Control should instigate the on call process for a suitable support response and also arrange for alternative transport to be available where appropriate. In stranded train situations, a TOLO must always be appointed to go to the site to manage operational activities with the Network Rail representative.

You should agree an emergency contact number that Control can issue to allow ongoing contact via pager or mobile phone. This dedicated number will allow reliable communication between Control and the evacuation site.

- *Opposite and adjacent lines*

  You do need to ensure that all train movements on any lines that may pose a risk to the evacuation have been stopped and the lines concerned blocked by the Signaller prior to starting evacuation. Where available, the TOLO or Network Rail Representative will confirm these arrangements are in place.

- *Controlled Evacuation*

  When available, the On Call Duty Manager will oversee the arrangements to evacuate the stranded train, providing a focus of management support to you in preparation for and during the evacuation.

- *Other help*

  Arrangements should also be made for station and on-train teams to assist on site. Local teams can be sent to the site by taxi or train if practicable, to assist in evacuation.

- *Safe egress*

  Once the evacuation has commenced, passengers should be directed and marshalled wherever possible to the agreed egress point to await rescue. Luggage should be taken, but only where this is practicable. Again, you should make a judgement on the feasibility of this and any delay it may cause.

- *Light sticks*

  The provision and use of light sticks is recommended to assist with management of customers in darkness. As well as assisting with evacuation from the vehicle, light sticks can also be used to mark out the safe walking route to the egress point.

- *Egress from the train*

  Egress from the train should be conducted using on-train emergency ladders or train to train bridges. The evacuation should always be carried out from a vehicle unaffected by damaged OLE to avoid accidental contact. A suitable person should remain on the train and assist people onto the ladder/bridge, with another suitable person at the base/opposite end. This person need not be a member of rail staff, but someone to whom staff can delegate the task with some confidence.

- *Evacuation estimates*

  Where only one ladder is provided on the train, it is estimated that it will take around 4 hours to carry out a full controlled evacuation of a stranded train of 400 passengers, i.e. approximately 30 seconds per passenger. The infrastructure manager or emergency services may be able to provide additional ladders, which will decrease the timescales commensurately, but this cannot be relied on. Rejoining the train will require similar timescales.

D2 Checklists for railway undertaking operations control

D2.1 Within first 30 minutes

When the train has become stranded, within the first 30 minutes:

- *Initial notification and assessment*

  As soon as you have been made aware of a stranded train, you should liaise with the traincrew and with the infrastructure manager Control to assess the situation, predict the possible outcome and begin planning for assistance, rescue and controlled evacuation as necessary, issuing 'on call' alerts as appropriate. Where a train has become stranded due to infrastructure related problems and there is no likelihood of it moving within 30 minutes, you must prepare for advice from the traincrew that the train is to be evacuated. The likelihood of needing to carry out controlled evacuation will be significantly increased if on-train environment control systems (primarily air conditioning) are no longer operational.

- *Appointment of TOLO*

  Appointment of a TOLO should be agreed where the delay is likely to exceed one hour (the TOLO and infrastructure manager's MOM can assist in the co-ordination of a safe controlled evacuation of the train if necessary).

- *Dedicated number*

  You should page out a 'dedicated' phone number to the traincrew to allow unhindered communication during the failure.

- *Technical response*

  You should also ensure that an appropriate level of technical response is provided to the failed train.

- *Location of train*

  You should obtain details of the location of the stranded train and the most suitable access point to it (for provision of supplies and to assist with any evacuation).

- *Information*

  Try to provide regular information to the traincrew of progress of rescue arrangements and make arrangements for dealing with potential problems identified by traincrew. These may include provision and delivery of refreshment supplies and notification of the BTP where appropriate.

- *Ongoing delay*

  Where the delay to the train is estimated to be in excess of one hour, customer response teams must be directed to site to provide essential customer support. Arrangements should also be made to provide rail replacement coaches to provide onward transport.

D2.2 Between 30 and 60 minutes

When the train has been stranded for between 30 and 60 minutes:

- *On-going assessment*

  You should continue to use your best judgement to predict likely outcomes and make necessary preparations, including mobilisation/direction of staff, to cater for identified realistic scenarios. These should include the possibility of an extended delay and/or a full controlled evacuation.

- *Appointment of TOLO*

  If delay is continuing and one has not already been appointed.

- *Emergency Services/|Local Authority*

  Consideration should be given to advising the British Transport Police (BTP), the civil emergency services and/or local authority emergency response contacts of the situation.

- *Customer response teams*

  You should now ensure customer response teams and rail replacement services are mobilised and en route to an agreed location from where customer support can be offered. Teams should be given specific details of access point(s) to the site. Arrange

for transport to the site from the most practicable location, using road or rail as appropriate.

Consideration should be given to mobilising these teams, irrespective of any 'estimates' of likely movement of stranded service.

- *Review arrangements*

  Try to regularly review arrangements with the traincrew to ensure that new developments are managed along with lack of progress during the crisis.

D2.3 Train evacuation (at the latest after 60 minutes)

After 60 minutes – sooner where circumstances demand - the train crew will make an assessment of the on-board conditions and, based on some set criteria, may decide that a full controlled evacuation of the train should be undertaken.

They should liaise with you and seek your agreement to this decision. In doing so they should advise you of the circumstances on board the train, including any degradation of the environmental conditions and consequent impact on passenger health and safety and you should take these factors fully into account when determining whether to support the decision to evacuate.

Among the criteria that help the traincrew to make the decision to recommend controlled evacuation is an accurate appraisal of the likelihood of rescue/restored power to the stranded train. Where you are in any doubt about the ability to effect a quick rescue, this information must be passed to the traincrew to allow them to make an appropriate assessment of the need for evacuation.

Prolonging this decision will result in worsening environmental conditions on the train and the likelihood both of serious medical problems to large numbers of people. External conditions may also deteriorate – weather conditions/temperatures may be worsening and remaining daylight may be limited (conducting an evacuation during the hours of darkness will inevitably present higher risks). Where passengers then resort to 'uncontrolled' self-evacuation, the potential exists for serious and even fatal injuries.

The appointed TOLO will co-ordinate the evacuation of the stranded train in conjunction with the train crew and the MOM.

D3 Checklists for station and on-board customer response teams

D3.1 Within first 60 minutes

When the train has become stranded, within the first 60 minutes:

- *Initial advice*

  On receiving advice of the situation, response teams must co-ordinate and ascertain the details of the stranded train, preparing the following arrangements:

  - *Assistance at failed train or evacuation site*

    A suitable response team should be made available to go to site if requested. This must be arranged, irrespective of any estimates of likely delay to the service.

  When advised that the stranded train is unlikely to move within one hour, the response team should go to site, agreeing with the Control how the site is to be accessed, using rail or road services as practicable.

  - *Refreshments*

    Arrange for (additional) refreshment supplies to be available for transport to site from the most practicable location.

    The need for additional supplies of water/refreshments to be brought to site should be assessed, taking account of possible rescue time. Requests should be made to the Operations Control who should then co-ordinate.

  - *Alternative road transport*

    Arrange alternative road transport where this is appropriate and the access to the site permits this.

    The response team must confirm that, in the event of a planned evacuation, rail replacement coaches have been arranged, and details of site location are understood.

- *At the train*

  When the response team arrives at the train, its members should assist the train crew as required, especially in the provision of refreshments and essential supplies to passengers.

D3.2 Train evacuation (at the latest after 60 minutes)

Once the decision has been made to evacuate the train and evacuation has commenced:

- *At the train*

  Assist with the evacuation of the train under the direction of the train crew, RIO, TOLO or such other person appointed as responsible for this.

- *At the station or other point at which evacuated persons are being assembled*

  Provide general support to those evacuated from the train, including provision of reassurance, information, water/refreshments, conveyance of messages to concerned family members, friends, work/business colleagues, etc. and direction to replacement road vehicles and/or accommodation/reception centres.

  Maintain contact with Operations Control to provide status reports on progress of evacuation and any emerging issues.